Lately I have been involved in a lot of talks about encryption. As laptops become more important, and people are literally storing their digital lives on them, some level of encryption is a good idea to protect data in the event of theft.
Most of the time when encryption comes up, breaches are the first thing mentioned. ”I heard that by freezing the RAM you can take data off of a sleeping computer”, etc. Most of these claims are likely true, but like anything else, data protection is a continuum. For the purpose of this discussion, we will compare encryption to cars. Triple AES-768 will be an Abrams Battle Tank (there is harder out there, but it is not going to move around much), and a system password will be a convertible. An Abrams and a convertible both have measures to protect the interior of a vehicle. Even though an Abrams is comparatively impenetrable, you see a lot more convertibles on the road. Why is this when the smaller car does not do nearly as good of a job at protecting items in it? To begin, an Abrams costs millions of dollars, weighs 70 tons, and is not normally accessible to the public. To a novice computer user, the AES-standard is an impossible concept. It is difficult to implement, requires a great deal of specialized knowledge, and is slow and bulky. Since our hypothetical user would at least like some protection from unexpected bad weather, a convertible is in order. It is cheap to run, accessible, and sporty.
You never hear people, even the Phil & Ted stroller-pushing new moms, mention that they want an A1 Battle Tank. Many try with an Escalade or the like, but once again, there is a continuum. They do not want the tank because they understand the costs and limitations of a 70-ton treaded vehicle (not to mention tearing up the subdivision). They understand that depleted-uranium armor is not needed to get from home to day care and back.
However, when we transfer the analogy back to the digital world, this understanding goes away. Everyone all of a sudden wants the most hardened security in the world, regardless of their status as a target or their activities. I manage to offend many people when I mention that the weakest link in any modern encryption platform is the user. They may get tired of slow read times and turn off disk encryption, they may use the same key for encryption or computer protection as they use to log into Gmail. They may write the key on a post it and leave it on their monitor, or tell a friend their password or e-mail it to themselves in case they forget. Even if they do not do these things, passwords are incredibly uncreative, and the concept of a passphrase is not yet mainstream. Knowing full well that most users will do things like this, it is hardly worth debating the relative merits and flaws of various encryption algorithms and standards. Users also need to understand their status as a target. Someone must be highly motivated to even attempt to guess a password, yet alone break disk encryption. If they are sufficiently motivated, any casual protection standards will not be a significant deterrent, and it is always a good idea to have a backup plan if you lose your data or if someone else gets it. Things like identity theft are a huge pain, but armoring yourself so heavily that you stand out from the pack will honestly just make people curious. Like the tank, there is no point having the armor unless you are willing to go through the training to operate it, and spend a great deal of time with maintenance. An Abrams with the keys left on a panel marked “car keys” in the garage is an awfully expensive front.
My personal data is protected to the highest standards that I can understand and maintain, and I am willing to accept performance slowdowns to compensate. However, beyond a certain point, my data protection priority shifts from protection from theft to protection from loss. If a dedicated team decides to devote tremendous resources, they will likely be able to obtain portions of my data. However, it would take an incredible feat to remove my data in a way that I too would lose it. Part of my redundancy involves offsite storage transfered online, and it is ironic that in choosing this redundancy, I expose my files to the wild land of the Internet. Even if you hide yourself in an impenetrable cocoon, you then have to worry about redundancy, and if you are paranoid enough, multiple site redundancy. At some point, one must bow to reason and realize that if someone wants your data badly enough, they will be able to obtain it, and the harder your security, the more likely it is that you will be the link in the chain that gives. A tank is not necessary to protect your family photos, just make sure you have your top up when you go out in bad weather…
If you are worried about your protection standards, just make a better password, and read up about data protection. As you understand a little more, you can switch to some home directory or full-disk options, and fall down the spiral of paranoia from there.